Substantial theoretical and conceptual advances have been made with respect to agendasetting as a determinant for policy outcomes. An actor-centred perspective on frames and venues is core to this literature, structure as a single standing category has received less attention. In this paper we argue that these results should be combined with bureaucratic politics in the European Commission to further our understanding of agenda setting processes in the European Union.
Within the policy-making process the agenda-setting phase has recently seen much scholarly attention as an important determinant for policy outcomes. For the EU political system substantial theoretical and conceptual advances have been made (Princen, 2009; Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008) . So far agenda-setting is primarily explained by the interplay between venues and framing.
Venues are understood as distinct institutional arenas that define which actors get involved into an issue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) . Frames refer to schemes of interpretation with which a particular issue is attached to extant conflict lines thus amplifying specific interest at the expense of others (e.g. Daviter, 2009 Daviter, : 1118 . Thus, the theoretical focus lies on how strategic actors actively move issues to favorable decision-making venues thereby drawing on existing or newly created frames that further their interest (Princen, 2009 ). Structure as a single standing category seems to be the poor cousin in this literature and if addressed it is easily subsumed under the institutional dimension of 'venue'. "Bureaucratic politics" (Allison, 1969; Hammond, 1986) , however, are typically of little particular concern.
In this paper we do not argue against an actor centred perspective. Rather we claim that complementing this approach with bureaucratic politics in the European Commission will further our understanding of agenda setting processes in legislative decision making of the European Union. Hereby we bring together two strands of recent research that emphasizes the value of a disaggregated view of the Commission to explain EU policy making. First, organisational theorists analyse how the internal departmentalization influences the individual positions of the internal actors and leads to conflicts within the Commission (e.g. Trondal et al., 2009 ; see also Egeberg, 2006a) . Second, EU agenda-setting literature stresses the multiple venues the Commission's internal fragmentation provides for political actors to upload their preferred choices to the EU agenda (e.g. Harcourt, 1998; Mörth, 2000; Princen and Rhinard, 2006) . This research is primarily interested in explaining individual positions and the strategic use that can be made of structure. We view the internal fragmentation as a precondition for our broader argument, which is that the existing rules and structures coordinating different positions systematically favour certain actors and therewith positions over others.
Our approach rests on two assumptions. First, under the umbrella of the European Commission different Directorates General and services (DGs) need to act together. Importantly, they must be expected to hold different positions, e.g. based on frames, perceptions or mandates. Therefore, second, issues and positions on legislative acts do not emerge endogenously but are the outcome of a set of actor choices which are aggregated by institutional structures. To be sure, structures do not pre-determine outcomes, but render some actor behaviour more likely than other (Scharpf, 1997) .
Looking at the internal process leading to the final legislative proposal by the Commission, we show how some internal actors' positions are more likely to be adopted than others'. Disregarding the influence of organisational structure and institutional rules on position formation within the Commission may ultimately lead to incorrect conclusions on final legislative outcomes. 1 We are interested in understanding whether the Commission's position is the result of an averaging out of different internal positions or whether the internal organisational structure renders some issues more likely to be adopted by the European Commissioners in a 1 Only where we take structure into account can we fully understand the conditions under which changes in the position with which the inter-institutional process starts are possible. What is more, the choice of inter-institutional settings, such as relevant Council formations or parliamentary committees typically arise from interaction within the Commission (Hartlapp, 2010, forthcoming) . And, how issues are asserted in the internal process influences the degree of conflict or the interaction modus of actors involved in the inter-institutional process (e.g. Fouilleux et al., 2005) . specific form rather than in another. In other words: Is the agenda set by the Commission the result of balanced or biased aggregation?
The argument presented in this paper rests on an author collected data base on the European Commission and on 127 semi structured expert interviews conducted with officials in Brussels from May to December 2009. 2 These interviews cover officials responsible for drafting proposals, more high ranking officials involved in the successive steps of the process (Directors-General, Cabinet members and Commissioners), as well as officials from the coordinating units in the SecretariatGeneral. This paper is structured as follows. In the next chapter we discuss divergences in the characteristics of internal Commission actors related to the process of position formation (2). We then uncover the organisational lines providing for the structure of the internal processes of position formation within the EU Commission (3). Mapping empirical variation in position formation on different dimensions will substantiate our argument (4). We conclude by discussing implications and related questions that will guide the further analysis (5).
A multitude of internal Commission actors
This section provides some descriptive evidence indicating that the preparation of legislative proposals involves a range of actors which differ along several dimensions. They follow different logics of legislative action, represent diverging outside interests and stakeholders, and vary in their involvement in the production of European legislation -thereby allowing for a multitude of competing frames (Schön and Rein, 1994 ; for the Commission: Mörth, 2000; cf. also Princen, 2009: 362) . 4
Mandates of internal actors
Much of the substantial work of policy formulation is done at the administrative level which itself is divided into 40 individual sub-organisations. Even the most basic characteristics of these so-called Directorates-General and services (DGs) indicate that the way any given policy problem is approached will vary along these organisational boundaries (cf. also Trondal et al., 2009 While it creates scope for conflicts of interest, the portfolio segmentation should also lead to varying problem perceptions, solution concepts or frames with regard to particular legislative acts. In line with more technocratic or functionalist approaches to sectoral decision-making, we may expect variances in problem definition, solution templates, and measurement of regulatory success across services (Egeberg, 1995) . In order to set the agenda for further European decision making, these different perspectives must be accommodated for which in turn the internal coordination structures of the Commission provide the only possible route.
Administrative setup
Varying preferences on a specific legislative problem can be further underlined by differences in the organisational setup (table 1). The most pronounced variance is found if we consider the budgets of the individual organisational units. The third column shows the overall payments a DG was entitled to in 2008. Unsurprisingly, the clear frontrunner is the Directorate General for Agriculture. On the other end of the continuum we find the services responsible for the internal market (MARKT), for competition (COMP), and for external trade relationships (TRADE), their respective annual payments represent even less than 0.15% of DG AGRI's overall spending.
Possible policy consequences of this budgetary variance among DGs become more visible if we consider how the money is spent by the different departments. Column four provides the share of its overall budget a DG uses on purely administrative entries. Again, the spread among the policy-oriented DGs is wide: While some DGs clearly focus on distributive tasks, others operate in a purely regulatory mode. In assuming that 'policies determine politics' (Lowi, 1964; 1972) , we should expect considerable divergences in the way different societal interests are represented and how policy problems are identified, approached and framed accordingly. 
Administrative and political leadership

Administrative coordination
The administrative coordination consists of mainly two parts: a more informal phase of DG interaction and the formal, written 'inter-service consultation' (ISC) via the database CIS-Net. 6 It is largely up to the lead department in how far it already coordinates with other DGs in the informal stage. However, this phase is getting increasingly more formalised with 'inter-service groups' more and more encouraged by the Secretariat General (SG, interviews COM 057, 092, 113). In addition, the introduction of the 'impact assessment' (IA) can be seen as a major contribution to more active and early coordination among the services (Schout and Jordan, 2008; Tholoniat, 2009, also interviews COM 033, 075, 118) For our argument it should be noted that certain practices introduced in order to simplify the work of an ever growing Commission should lead to biased aggregation. Only a selection of all DGs is actually consulted in the formal ISC. And where a formally consulted DG fails to respond within the given deadline, this is treated as agreement to the document despite the respective DG maybe having had disagreed. In sum, the extant organisational structures systematically privilege the lead department as well as the SG as firsts among equals in the process of the Commission forming a common position. In the following section the roles of the SG and the lead department will be addressed in more detail.
The Secretariat General
The SG plays an increasingly important monitoring role throughout the whole internal coordination. Since the Kinnock reforms, and even more so with the Barroso term, the SG enforces early 'upstream coordination', by now one of the guiding principles of the current Secretary General Catherine Day (interviews COM 015 and 066). It aims at early steering and screening of the internal processes in order to prevent conflicts appearing at later stages of decision making, and consequently strengthens the role of the SG as the Commission's watchdog. To achieve this, the SG has introduced the post of 'policy coordination officials' looking "at the preparation of the documents, the quality of the documents and the internal coordination, in other words, that all associated or concerned DGs have been properly consulted" (interview COM 066), "so that things do not come jumping on the agenda from one DG which the others do not know about, have not heard about completely" (interview COM 017, also COM 046). To this aim SG officials have various means at their disposal: They may attend inter-service group meetings or may step in whenever they deem it necessary to stop the process, to give it a steer or to act as a broker when conflicts occur (interviews COM 015 and COM 057).
Further, the SG plays a pivotal role in assigning the lead DG for a legislative proposal. Often this is self-evident. Yet, this is not the case for all acts, especially not for more cross-cutting and overarching projects, aiming at solving some of today's most pressing societal problems. 9 The assignment is part of the long-term Strategic Planning and Programming (SPP) cycle of the Commission managed by the SG. 10 As part of the SPP, the operational annual Commission's Legislative and Work Programme (CLWP) defines the concrete initiatives to be launched and which DG is going to be lead, described as "a very bottom-up process" (interviews COM 015 and 066). However it also, and increasingly so over time, entails a very hierarchical component. After bilateral talks, where the SG and the President's Head of Cabinet receive the respective Director-General and discuss the items that the DG proposes, the SG ultimately decides about the timing and more importantly about priorities, necessary cooperation and 'non'-initiatives (interviews COM 066 and COM 015).
Thus, the SG is in a distinguished position in setting policy priorities on the internal agenda and influencing how much say a policy portfolios has in a certain legislative drafting.
Lead Department
The lead department, the DG primarily responsible for the drafting of a document, is in the strong position of the agenda-setter putting down a first version of a proposal that is to be launched. Thus, it can largely determine the frame and focus of a legislative objective (cf. Mörth, 2000) . The institutional rules allow the lead department to influence the aggregation of positions by channelling the informal and formal involvement of other DGs. In the interviews conducted so far, we find considerable variance in a lead department's decision to allow for co-drafting of another service or to rather inform others at a very late stage, as far as obviously cross-cutting issues are concerned (interviews COM 059 & COM 015). And in the subsequent formal written inter-service consultation it is the lead that decides which policy DGs are consulted.
Moreover, the lead DG has the choice to integrate the comments of another service or to attach them and leave them open for discussion at political level, where different logics and resources are decisive. Thereby it can deliberately choose the decisionmaking venue that is most beneficial to its aims -however the available opportunities prescribed are by the structure and rules governing the process.
Political Coordination
The political coordination of a legislative draft starts after the transferral of the document from the services to the Commissioners and their Cabinets. In terms of political coordination one can distinguish between first, different procedures -i.e. whether a proposal is adopted in written or in oral procedure -and second, between different coordinative steps. A written procedure is initiated by the SG at the request of one or more Members of the Commission. All Cabinets receive copies of the agreement and have the opportunity to respond before a given deadline, otherwise their agreement is assumed. If they have objections, however, they enter into bilateral talks and if no consensus can be achieved this way, the initiative is decided To sum up, the coordination of position formation within the EU Commission has proven to be an increasingly, but still only partially formalized process. As well the administrative as the political coordination processes leave considerable leeway in drafting a policy proposal, providing for a multitude of access points for interactions among the DGs. Further, the organisational structures and practices seem to favour certain actors, most notably the President's Secretariat General and the lead 11 Related to administrative decisions the 'delegation procedure' exists, which defers from the collegiality principle by assigning exclusive responsibility to a subgroup of Commissioners (Spence, 2006a) . 12 Egeberg (2006b: 8) quantifies the phenomenon to 8-10 formal votes per year in the Prodi Commission as opposed to hundreds of yearly decisions. The Delors Commissions were characterised by more actual votes than ever before or after (Peterson, 1999: 53 
Balanced or biased aggregation?
Our findings have indicated that we must expect considerable variation in actor positions for any given legislative proposal. We have further shown that the internal coordination structures yield different weight to different actors in the process of forming the agenda the Commission sets. In this section we substantiate our argument by presenting empirical evidence on DG variance in legislative output, in level of decision making and in DG interaction.
Empirical evidence on legislative output
As sketched above, a DG acting in the role of the lead department has structural advantages in putting its position through where diverging opinions among the internal actors of the Commission emerge. On a more aggregate level this means that the overall legislative output of the Commission may be skewed towards those DGs that act more frequently as the lead department than others. COMP  EAC  ECFIN  EMPL  ENTR  ENV  INFSO  JLS  MARE  MARKT  REGIO  RTD  SANCO  TAXUD  TREN  DEV  ELARG  RELEX  TRADE  ADMIN  BUDG  COMM  SG  SJ % of drafted directives EAC  ECFIN  EMPL  ENTR  ENV  INFSO  JLS  MARE  MARKT  REGIO  RTD  SANCO  TAXUD  TREN  DEV  ELARG  RELEX  TRADE  ADMIN  BUDG  COMM  SG First of all, the emerging picture clearly shows that the different actors within the Commission contribute to a vastly varying extent to the number of legislative initiatives proposed by the Commission as a whole. 13 Regarding regulations in figure   2a , acts which are binding in their entirety and directly applicable throughout the Union, the largest share of about 32% is drafted by DG TRADE closely followed by the about 13% proposed by DG MARE. Both DGs, however, hold rather specific mandates so that one may argue that the scope of their output -for example as measured by the number of directly affected citizens -is rather limited as compared to DGs with broader policy responsibilities.
The variance among other policy DGs depicted in the left panel of the figure is comparatively less pronounced with the notable exception of DG AGRI (about 8% of Commission output). Though their share is small, it should also be noted that the horizontal services such as the Secretariat General (SG) or the Legal Service (SJ) also take responsibility in leading the drafting of 2 and 4 %, respectively, of the regulations proposed by the Commission.
Further, figure 2b shows the distribution of primary responsibility among internal Commission actors for directives. This instrument of European legislation is also binding in its entirety but leaves room to member states how to transpose it into national law. Here, a fewer number of Commission services contribute to Commission output at all. Looking at the policy DGs first, we see that the output of DG MARKT (internal market) more than doubles that of DG EMPL (employment, social affaires and equal opportunities). If the structural advantages of being lead are exploited, this would clearly favour the position of DG MARKT in the overall Commission output. The most eye-catching observation in figure 2b is the large share of the Legal Service (SJ). This horizontal service accounts for almost one quarter of directives proposed by the Commission. One potential origin of this observation is the Better Regulation agenda of the Commission under which the Legal Service is 13 Note, that it may be that those DGs having more supranational competences also produce more legal acts and are more often in the lead position. As DGs' portfolios are not as clear cut as the Treaty text, however, and in many cases it is difficult to ascribe a level of competence to a DG per se, we abstain from introducing a measure.
active in codifying and simplifying extant legislation. Nevertheless, significant policy effects may emerge from the large number of directives primarily drafted in this horizontal service.
Lastly, the picture for decisions -an instrument that directly addresses individuals, firms, or member states individually and thus is somewhat more limited in scopein figure 2c also tells its own story. The DGs concerned with external relations are more prominently represented and account together for about 35% of the Commission's overall output on this legislative instrument. Within the policy family, the DG for taxation and customs union (TAXUD) provides the largest piece of the pie, followed by environment (ENV) and agriculture (AGRI).
While final conclusions without sufficient theoretical backing and focus on legislative competences would be premature, the overall picture does not provide for a perception of a Commission that systematically balances its overall output across the internal actors it is made up of. Rather, the varying frequencies of being primarily responsible for a proposal must be expected to move the overall Commission position to the benefit of some and at the expense of others.
Empirical frequencies of interaction at the political level
Empirical evidence on coordination at the political level (section 0) suggests that only 13.2% of all Commission proposals between 2004 and 2008 were actually negotiated in the College. 14 In other words, a rather large share of legislative proposals was already agreed among the services prior to the political level. Figure 3 shows that the variation in the likelihood with which a proposal was negotiated in the College varies with the DG that was primarily responsible. 
Empirical evidence on overall DG interaction
Uncovering patterns of systematic DG interaction is difficult, as the Commission withholds respective data from the public. 16 Based on data on ‚associated' DGs, Notes: Y-axis indicates the absolute number of proposals a DG was primarily responsible for in 2000 (lead DG). The x-axis, in-turn, shows the absolute frequency with which a DG contributed to a proposal without being in the lead (associated DG). Further, links describe relationships between two specific DGs where outgoing arrows indicate that the origin DG had the lead in the interaction while incoming arrows indicate that the DG served as an associate in this relationship. Finally, the width of this links reveals the frequency with which both DGs interacted in legislative drafting during 2000. Source:
Author compiled data from the PreLex database.
We distinguish the different types of secondary legislation. On the vertical axis, the internal Commission actors are ordered by the absolute frequency of being lead department. The horizontal axis, in turn, denotes the absolute frequency with which a DG was associated to specific drafting processes. The arrows indicate interactions between specific DGs and are the wider the more often these two DGs have worked together on a legislative proposal.
First of all, the figure confirms what has been assumed before: Interaction between the departments of the European Commission is the norm rather than the exception.
For all three legislative instruments, the variation across the frequency of being associated to a proposal is higher than the variation in being the primarily responsible department. This is hardly surprising as responsibility presumably involves much more effort than being associated. Nevertheless the figure indicates that nearly all DGs do influence proposals primarily drafted by other DGs and that a lot of interaction takes place. This emphasises that one must not only look at the positions of the internal actors, but also at the coordination structures that monitor the various actors in order to understand the agenda the Commission sets.
Conclusion
The lack of attention paid to structure and "bureaucratic politics" (Allison, 1969; Hammond, 1986) in explaining the Commission's agenda was the starting point for our paper. Combining literature from the area of organisational studies and agenda setting in the EU with empirical information on internal Commission decisionmaking we address these weaknesses. By concentrating on the Commission's organisational structure and its institutional rules we argue that their ignorance ultimately risks to inadequately conceptualise EU decision-making more broadly.
Only where we take the internal structure into account we can fully understand the Commission's agenda; that is "the set of issues receiving serious consideration" (Princen, 2009: 21) the Commission feeds into the inter-institutional process. What is more, the choice of inter-institutional venues, such as Council formations or Parliamentary committees, typically arises from this interaction within the Commission. And, how issues are asserted in the internal process influences the degree of conflict or the interaction modus of actors involved in the inter-institutional process.
The look inside the Commission reveals that its internal actors -the DirectoratesGeneral -are remarkably diverse in mandates, administrative setup and resources.
Accordingly, we can assume them to hold diverging positions on most policy problems which then have to be coordinated in order to generate a common Commission position. Uncovering the respective coordination structure, however, leads to the conclusion that certain actors are favoured over others. Most notably, at the Commission's administrative level the lead department can influence the number and constellation of other internal actors that may have influence on its initial legislative draft. What is more, in the case of conflict with other Directorates-General this department can decide whether the diverging positions should be resolved at the administrative or at the political level of the Commission. Hereby, it can select the internal arena that will produce its most favoured outcome.
Comparably skewed influence grants the internal structure of the Commission only to the Secretariat-General, a DG that is politically led by the Commission President.
Through the more recent mechanisms of impact assessments and programming, this service can interfere early on in the process at administrative level. Next to assigning the lead department, it may intervene in the lead department's discretion in assigning other internal actors -and thus issues, frames and different interests -to a particular proposal. However, whether this has a balancing effect remains to be seen and should be a question of further empirical research.
All in all, Schattschneider's (1960: 30) dictum that "organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action" appears to hold for Europe's central agenda-setter. Our descriptive data on empirical variation of internal actors' involvement in decision-making speaks against a perception of a Commission that can systematically balance its overall output across the varying interests of the internal actors it is made up of. Even at the most basic level, we find variation in the frequencies with which DGs act as a lead department for proposed pieces of legislation, in the frequencies with which DG proposals are debated at the political level, and in the patterns of interaction between different DGs.
Admittedly, a pure recourse to these structural variables is only one part of the story.
While structurally privileged positions within the Commission add to our understanding, they remain somewhat bloodless as long as we do not link them to relevant policy issues and dimensions -such as market liberalization versus regulatory intervention -and complement them with other power resources internal
Commission actors might hold. Nonetheless, this paper shows that future research needs the organisational structure and the internal rules of the European
Commission as an indispensable building block in explanations of the EU's political agenda.
